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Abstract: Although accepting that the Discounted Cash Flow model of 
investment appraisal has well known technical limitations, researchers 
have begun to explore its performative properties. This paper 
demonstrates how the Discounted Cash Flow model frames negotiations 
between actors around narratives of economization, marketization and 
financialization in a regulated industry. Reconnecting economics and 
politics, the theory of Cultural Political Economy is used to interpret 
and evaluate an empirical study of Great Britain's electricity generating 
industry. Although alternative imaginaries, based on political and 
employment goals, have historically influenced investment decision making 
in the industry, the current narrative of investment appraisal is 
dominated by Discounted Cash Flow models. These models have allowed 
industry players to construct imaginaries of an investment hiatus, 
leading to the possibility of future power cuts and blackouts, and a need 






Much of the Investment Appraisal (IA) literature conforms to Northcott’s (1991:221) 
observation that Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)1 concepts proceeded from economic 
literature, conveying many of the basic premises of neo-classical theory. Economic 
literature introduces notions of economic efficiency and shareholder wealth 
maximization, which are embedded in a normative context of economic formalism 
and instrumentalism (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009). We argue that models of 
investment, such as DCF and Net Present Value (NPV), should not be perceived as 
purely passive calculative techniques. Accounting models such as DCF, can “do 
things”, not just fulfilling the conventional prescriptive role of assisting human actors 
to make investment decisions, but also helping ‘to create and distribute Homo 
Economicus…’ as ‘…economic agents result[ing] from the framing and distribution of 
calculative agencies’ (Vosselman, 2014:184). Yet the argument presented here is 
not merely that human ontologies can be changed but ‘that calculation and 
noncalculation reside not primarily within human subjects but in material 
arrangements, systems of measurement, and methods of displacement - or their 
absence’ (Callon and Law, 2005: 718). In this sense, the IA model is itself an actor 
and ‘rather than representing reality, directly intervenes to construct the reality it 
purports to describe…’ (Cushen, 2013:316). 
 
We develop these performative aspects of IA models (Doganova, 2009) in the 
empirical context of negotiations about the construction of new electricity generating 
plants (known generally as Power Stations). Just as Callon (1998a; 2007) and 
MacKenzie (2007) have shown how a model such as the Black-Scholes formula can 
help make derivative markets; our submission is that the NPV/DCF model can frame 
public policy debates in a particular way. Our specific public policy concerns relate to 
negotiations around the regulation of the electricity generation industry. Such 
negotiations could draw on diverse perspectives, such as: scientific, engineering, 
political, and regulatory. Although significant negotiations centre on economic 
concepts (Hoffmann, 2007), we argue that an economic focus is not inevitable, but 
rather arises from processes of economization (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009), 
 
1 
DCF means Discounted Cash-Flow and is used interchangeably with Net Present Value (NPV). 
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marketization (Çalışkan and Callon, 2010), and financialization (Cushen, 2013) 
supported by various human and non-human actors. We argue that IA models, 
especially DCF/NPV, provide a common frame of reference for negotiators, driving 
the financialization process and promoting a neo-liberal approach. Throughout this 
process, issues of sustainability and security of supply are subsumed into a 
financialized discourse or agencement (Callon, 2007), framed by accounting 
calculations and financial rates of return. 
 
Elaborating on MacKenzie’s ‘conditions of felicity’ (2007:69), we analyze the cultural, 
political and economic circumstances in which the performativity of DCF/NPV is  
likely to be enhanced, and other situations when counter performativity or misfires 
occur. We propose an alternative political economy theory that recognizes the 
performative aspects of economic and accounting models, but which locates them in 
critical and reflexive frames. Hereby, we seek to reconnect economics and politics 
around performativity, to develop performativity as politics, ‘to help reinforce political 
analysis of markets and market-making…’ (Cochoy et al., 2010:141). In particular, 
we draw on the concept of imaginaries, as developed by the theory of Cultural 
Political Economy (CPE) (Sum, 2012; Jessop and Sum, 2016). We demonstrate that 
the electricity market in Great Britain (GB) has been subject to ongoing 
experimentation (Callon, 2009), arising from the construction of different imaginaries. 
Developing the negotiating role of IA models, we argue that the generators have 
posited a future imaginary of blackouts and power cuts, proceeding from a failure to 
invest in new generating capacity. In essence, the generators mobilized IA models 
as rhetorical devices in policy negotiations with the GB government. By analyzing the 
outcomes of these negotiations, we evaluate the extent to which they can be 
attributed to the performative role of IA models. 
 
In order to set out its theoretical and methodological foundations, the paper proceeds 
with a selective review of the literature on performativity, particularly concentrating  
on capital budgeting and the electricity generation industry. It then proceeds to use 
CPE theory to interpret original fieldwork. Finally, drawing on the theory and the 
empirics, the paper discusses capital budgeting practices in relation to complex 






A performative perspective on IA models - framing, spillovers and calculative 
practices 
This section grounds our performative perspective in IA models drawn from the wider 
literature on economization, marketization, financialization and calculative practices. 
It argues that IA models can play a role in framing all these processes, but also 
acknowledges that such framing is inevitably accompanied by spillovers that 
confound attempts to de-politicize (Callon, 2010) issues such as energy generation. 
Then, building on an emerging literature on critical performativity (Spicer et al., 2009; 
Wickert and Schaefer, 2015; Cabantous et al., 2016), we discuss alternative political 
economy theories that recognize the performative aspects of economic and 
accounting models, but which locate them in critical and reflexive frames. 
From the outset of this review, we are indebted to Callon’s insights concerning the 
performativity of economic theories, as they offer the broadest concept and the 
broadest frame (see figure 1, Callon, 1998a; 1998b; 2007; 2010). Callon argues that 
economic theories not only intend to represent reality but that, ‘economics, with the 
multiplicity of frames of analysis and theoretical models that it develops, contributes 
to the constitution of the object that it studies’ (2010:163). Elaborating on the 
performativity of economics, Çalışkan and Callon (2009) identify processes of 
economization, which denote ‘the processes that constitute the behaviours, 
organizations, institutions and, more generally, the objects in a particular society 
which are tentatively and often controversially qualified, by scholars and/or lay 
people, as “economic’’’ (p.370). Economization processes proceed from a broad 
definition of ‘economics at large’, which includes other disciplines and practices, 
including accounting (Vosselman, 2014). In the specific context of this paper, the 
economizing framework identifies the problem of electricity supply as a question of 
economics, rather than conceiving of it as a scientific, engineering or political issue. 
The economizing frame can be further narrowed through a process of marketization 
(Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; 2010). Çalışkan and Callon (2010) argue that markets 
‘delimit and construct a space of confrontation and power struggles…’, creating 
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spaces in which, ‘…(M)ultiple contradictory definitions and valuations of goods as 
well as agents oppose one another in markets until the terms of the transaction are 
peacefully determined by pricing mechanisms’ (p.3). The next, and even narrower, 
frame involves processes of financialization, increasing the importance of financial 
actors and calculative devices both within and between organizations (Cushen, 2013; 
Vosselman, 2014). 
Financialization elevates the particular performative role of accounting, as 
accounting calculative models traditionally privilege shareholder interests. The 
financial orientation is particularly strong in DCF, which purports to connect internal 
decisions on investments with interests of external investors. Indeed, finance theory 
argues that firms can be viewed as bundles of projects, with their total value 
determined by the sum of their DCFs (Copeland et al., 2004). From a performativity 
perspective, it can be argued that financial theories such as NPV, ‘are actualized’ as 
long as the ‘conditions of felicity’ (Callon 2007, 321) are fulfilled. Some key 
conditions of felicity for the DCF model are the same as those supporting the Black- 
Scholes formula; namely, a dominant belief in the efficient markets hypothesis and 
‘…a political culture in which economics was a useful source of legitimacy’ 
(MacKenzie, 2007:70). MacKenzie also mentions specific institutional and material 
changes which enabled the Black-Scholes formula to appear ‘less unrealistic’ (2007: 
74). For example, short selling became more practical when institutional investors, 
such as pension funds, were prepared to lend their stock and when the New York 
stock exchange introduced stock-index futures. As becomes apparent later in our 
elaboration of CPE, the pro-market, neoliberal institutions of the recent privatization 
era were part of a wider neoliberal political culture. In the different political culture 
which was the pre-privatization period, DCF was less closely linked to financial and 
marketized frames. With the generating industry in GB under public ownership, DCF 
was promoted as the “correct” investment model, because it prompted decisions that 
might increase national economic growth (Miller, 1991) rather than maximize 
shareholder wealth, as supposed under neoclassical finance theory. In short, 
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material and institutional factors can sometimes reinforce semantic and discursive 
factors,2 whilst at other times, such as times of crisis, they may act against them. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between these frames. Moving from the macro- 
level of economization into the more micro-levels of marketization, financialization 
and calculation, the arrows emphasize that frames are in recursive and reciprocal 
relationships. Although the calculation of NPV/DCF combines a myriad of issues, 
reducing them to a single figure (Miller, 2001), the model affects the more macro- 




Insert Figure 1. Framing and spillovers: economization, marketization and financialization 
 
 
The DCF and the mediation of negotiations between actors in the electricity industry 
 
One of the strengths of the performativity thesis is that rather than viewing 
accounting as fulfilling merely a symbolic role, in which specific calculative features 
are relatively unimportant, the technical characteristics of a model such as NPV/DCF 
are important in enabling it to “do things”. Whilst the conventional prescriptive role of 
these models is to evaluate choices between well-structured investment alternatives, 
in a negotiating context, the technical characteristics of the models help it achieve 
other objectives, such as framing the way that alternatives are presented. For 
example, one of the useful technical features of the DCF model in a negotiating 
context, is that, while ‘the contents of the DCF formula seem to be extremely flexible, 
its structure appears rigidly robust’ (Doganova, 2011:13). Thus, different 
assumptions about technology and pricing levels can all be modelled to ensure 
understanding from all players. Furthermore, the various forms of the DCF offer a 
single figure incorporating the relationship between costs and revenues (profit), and 
introducing a time value for money and cost of capital to capture businesses’ 
financial risks. Miller (2001) emphasizes the ‘elegance of the single figure’ (p.382) by 





We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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calculable, and amenable to control’ (p.391). Similarly, Bowman et al. (2014) explain 
the influence of the ‘point value principle’ enshrined in the discounting calculation: 
The techniques now taught as discounted cash flow offer a way of converting 
any future stream of payments over time into a ‘point value’ in the present… the 
future is converted into the present through algebra which requires only the 
inputs of estimated cash flows and an appropriate discount rate… (p.124) 
 
 
The performativity thesis suggests that some of the technical criticisms of DCF 
underestimate its practical relevance as a business model. For example, Doganova 
and Eyquem-Renault (2009:1559) note that ‘puzzlement’ might arise from the fact 
that, ‘whilst cogent analysis from management science tends to debunk the 
calculative power of the business model, investors and entrepreneurs continue to 
consider it a key ingredient of their economic endeavours’. Doganova and Eyquem- 
Renault (2009) contend that whilst business models may appear flawed to academic 
critics, they play a central role as ‘market devices’ (Callon et al., 2007); serving the 
creation of current and future economic realities. 
In this paper, the key business model associated with the future reality of the 
regulated electricity market is the DCF model. It is used as a valuation device, 
assisting in the construction of a shared reality for all the human players responsible 
for negotiating on environmental issues and regulated price-setting. Yet, as 
Vosselman explains, an accounting device such as the DCF is more than just ‘a re- 
presentation of reality, it also mediates between actants in a network’; ‘… it shapes 
who and what counts and ‘(A)s an actant, the ‘presence’ manufactured by 
accounting is symmetrical to human actors; it has material agency’ (p. 183). Dugdale 
(1999) argues that traditional analysis of negotiations focus on interests and power, 
but fail to explain how power is mobilized through aspects of practical materiality. To 
her examples of committees drinking coffee and shuffling papers, we would add the 
material agency of calculative practices, such as financial models. In the negotiations 
analyzed here, the NPV model performs a mediating role linking science (climate 
change and engineering), the economy (Miller and O’Leary, 2007; Doganova and 
Eyquem-Renault, 2009 and Doganova, 2011) and firms to political programmes 
(Miller, 1991). As Miller puts it: 
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If figures are intrinsically linked to programmes, and if they can transform the 
domains that they represent and act upon, then the single financial figure is a 
technology of intervention par excellence (Miller 1994b, as cited in Miller, 2008). 
For the single financial figure not only accords objectivity and neutrality, it 
makes comparable activities and processes that may otherwise have little in 
common. The single financial figure, as produced by the calculative routines of 
accounting, can link up agents and activities into a functioning calculative and 
programmatic ensemble (Miller, 2008, pp57-58). 
 
An example of the practical materiality of the NPV figure is given in figure two, which 
demonstrates how a think tank has compared electricity generating policy options 
based on different generating technologies (e.g. no nuclear versus carbon capture). 
Significantly, the economic costs of each policy option were compared through the 
calculation of a single NPV figure, based on a specified social discount rate. Thus, it 
is possible to observe the practical materiality (Dugdale, 1999) of the DCF/NPV 
model as it mediates science and the economy by drawing on a combination of 
natural sciences (engineering and climate), and calculating their economic 




Insert Figure 2. Think tanks modelling environmental targets within engineering knowledge 
 
As we argued above, the concepts of framing and performativity do not imply that a 
model such as DCF/NPV can create markets out of nothing. Rather such models 
actualize rather than create (Callon, 2006), with the performative and re- 
presentational properties of a financial model intertwined in socio-material networks 
(MacKenzie, 2007; Vosselman, 2014). As discussed earlier, the actualization of a 
particular reality depends on a combination of discursive and material factors. In 
order to elaborate on this ‘material-discursive making of the world’ (Nyberg and 
Wright, 2016:618), we avoid the traditional sociological perspective on institutions 
(Latour, 2005; Modell et al., 2017). Instead we follow Callon (2007), who proposes 
the concept of socio-technical agencements. If a socio-technical agencement is ‘a 
combination of heterogeneous elements that have been carefully adjusted to one 
another’ (Callon, 2007: 319) then, in our context, an excellent example of how an 
institution may be re-cast as a socio-technical agencement is the university think 
tank. As shown in figure 2, a university based think tank, based in a mechanical 
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engineering department, can deploy the NPV model as a way of comparing the 
economic impacts of alternative technologies. These economic experiments also 
unite other materialities, such as knowledge drawn from engineering and climate 
science, which are the sources of the various policy options. Such think tanks do not 
just emerge by chance in a political and policy vacuum. Rather, technical and 
financial support for these institutions was obtained from industry actors, notably 
some of the generators, who, as we show later, have very specific financial interests 
at stake in the outcomes of these policy experiments (Callon, 2010). 
 
 
Framing, spillovers, mis-fires and counter-performativity 
 
Thus far, in our review of the performativity thesis, we have emphasized how 
economic and accounting models might act as framing devices, particularly when 
felicitous conditions prevail (Callon, 2007). We might anticipate that just as the 
performative impact of the DCF model may prejudice negotiations towards neoliberal, 
minimalist state type solutions, the model will find that felicitous conditions are likely 
to abound when political programmes are already pre-disposed towards neoliberal 
economic policies. Yet even under these conditions, there are limits to performativity 
characterized by spillovers (Callon, 2007) or counter-performativity (MacKenzie, 
2007). Indeed, spillovers are just as significant as frames; one is the  by-product of 
the other (Callon, 1998a). Overflows are inevitable, because ‘moments of overflow 
mark the emergence of a frame’s shortcomings, and in so doing make material, legal 
or other framing devices visible while inspiring debates on how these might be 
improved’ (Çalışkan and Callon, 2010: 8)3. 
The role of framing and spillovers has been researched in relation to environmental 
regulation, carbon markets and re-cycling (Callon, 2009; Lohmann, 2009; MacKenzie, 
2009; Gregson et al., 2013). Researchers have identified the role of specific 
calculative devices, such as ship assaying (Gregson et al., 2013), the role of 
experiments in the design of markets (Callon, 2009), the role of cost-benefit, carbon 
accounting techniques (Lohmann, 2009), and the possibility of a ‘politics of market 
3 
For example, the prices contractually agreed in the contract to construct Hinckley point nuclear power station 
are now so high and out of line with prices of alternative energy sources that even pro-market commentators are 
beginning to question a private sector approach to the project (Jeremy Warner, DT, August 2017). 
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design’ (MacKenzie, 2009). Discussing the debate concerning the ‘distribution 
between politics and economics’ (Callon, 2010:164), Callon uses the example of 
climate change programmes to illustrate the diversity of policy proposals, some of 
which use the carbon markets, and others that reject market solutions entirely 
(Lohmann, 2009). 
The performativity of economic theory and accounting need not be analyzed solely in 
terms of the neoclassical model and neoliberal political economy. Indeed, Callon 
(2010) argues that, given the diversity of economic theories, performativity allows 
differing conceptualizations of the relationship between economics and politics. For 
example, traditional political economy theory implies economic actors are embedded 
in social and institutional arrangements (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; 2010). Similarly, 
Miller (2008) explains how, in the political economy of accounting, accounting is 
‘viewed as a partial and interested language and practice, representing particular 
occupational groups and classes’ (p.55). When performativity is informed by the 
political economy approach it can also develop a critical perspective on calculating 
devices by studying the relations of domination, as Çalışkan and Callon point out, 
‘(I)nequalities derive from the unequal power of calculating agencies that loop back 
to reinforce themselves’ (2010:13). Proposing a progressive view of performativity 
within the critical management tradition, Fleming and Banerjee argue that ‘(W)ithout 
a wider political analysis of organizations, institutions and markets, the capacity to 
perform economic rationality differently will be limited, which in turn restricts the 
scope for politics, political subjectivity and dialogue…’ (2016:263). 
Developing theory and methodology: CPE and the concept of imaginaries 
Critical accounting theory can reveal the historically contingent and contested nature 
of DCF. For example, Miller (1991) illustrated how, in an historical context, the role  
of DCF in industries such as the electricity generation was both contested and linked 
to broader concerns of national economic growth. Building on this seminal 
contribution with an analysis of energy policy based on cultural political economy 
(CPE) (Sum, 2012; Jessop, 2013; Jessop and Sum, 2016), we propose developing a 
critical performativity approach, which can be applied to both historical and recent 
developments in investment decision making in the GB electricity industry. The 
ontological and epistemological approach of CPE is entirely consistent with 
performativity, as the concept of the imaginary offers a way to study the links 
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between the performativity of the DCF model, within the context of the major 
structural relationships that characterize state-market relations (Sum, 2012). 
11  
 
In their exposition of CPE, Jessop and Sum (2016) argue that social life is only 
possible because actors simplify reality by drawing on imaginaries, as ‘clusters of 
meaning’ (p.107). Focusing on ontology, CPE embodies the view that since the  
world is complex, social agents ‘must reduce complexity by selectively attributing 
meaning to some of its features rather than others’ (Jessop, 2013:3). These agents 
draw on what Jessop (2010; 2013) terms imaginaries. An imaginary is ‘a semiotic 
ensemble (without tightly defined boundaries) that frames individual subjects’ lived 
experience of an inordinately complex world and/or guides collective calculation 
about that world’ (Jessop, 2013:4). Imaginaries can have different applications; for 
example, highlighting generators’ economic imaginaries. Jessop (2013:4) explains 
economic imaginaries below: 
Economic imaginaries have a crucial constitutive role here insofar as they 
identify, privilege, and seek to stabilize some economic activities from the 
totality of economic relations. They give meaning and shape thereby to the 
‘economic’ field but are always selectively defined. 
 
 
Whilst other actors responsible for influencing investment decisions also draw on 
imaginaries, they might place lesser emphasis on economic elements. For example, 
Levy and Spicer (2013) propose four possible climate change imaginaries: ‘fossil 
fuels forever’, ‘climate apocalypse’, ‘techno-market’ and ‘sustainable lifestyles’. They 
also suggest the techno-market imaginary proved particularly influential up to the 
economic crisis of the mid-2000s, as they describe this imaginary as optimistic and 
pro-market: 
 
…based on advanced clean energy technologies such as solar and wind 
alongside carbon trading and other market innovations. The invocation of 
innovation, entrepreneurship, venture capital and carbon markets allocates a 
primary role to the private sector in addressing climate change, lending this 




The techno-market imaginary is also compatible with some components of regulation 
and state intervention, as long as the fundamental tenets of the capitalist market are 
respected. For example, an imaginary that supposes a form of Green Keynesianism 
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(Levy and Spicer, 2013) can easily accommodate an IA discourse on “correct” long 
term social discount rates (Arrow et al., 2012) and the various carbon reduction 
options compared in figure 2. 
Building on our earlier discussion of framing, practical materialities and negotiation, 
we submit that an accounting calculation such as DCF can play an important 
mediating role in the creation of a particular economic imaginary. We also perceive 
that opportunities for the DCF model can be used strategically to frame negotiations 
between different industry players. More specifically, as shown in figure 3, the 
generators can mobilize the DCF model to construct an imaginary with a very simple 
logic; that is, negative NPVs result in no new investment, creating possibilities of 
power-cuts and black-outs. 
The DCF model privileges particular aspects of economic activity, such as cash  
flows, risks and discount rates. This disaggregation is illustrated in figure 3, which 
shows how the required return might be achieved through interventions at a number 
of points, which themselves might be expected to feature in negotiations between 
private generators seeking required returns and government regulators. For example, 
costs (negative cash flows) could be affected by regulations requiring specific 
technologies in order to meet pollution targets. Discount rates can be affected by the 
perceived risk of investments calculated on the basis of cash flows underpinned by a 
particular set of price curves 4 . The message of the model is clear; if the GB 
government aims to guarantee supply and meet environmental targets, then, in a 
market context, it must use pricing mechanisms to incentivize those private 
generators who demand positive NPVs. The model in figure 3 is intentionally very 
simple: it does not capture issues of uncertainty, the strategies of multinational 
companies, or explain how a discourse involving DCF can trap negotiators and rule 
out non-market oriented imaginaries. Nevertheless, by casting negotiation problems 
in terms of a standard NPV model comprised of revenues (positive cash flows), costs 
(negative cash flows), and discount rates, a narrative based on the NPV model is 
characterized by hegemonic financialization rhetoric (Froud et al., 2006; Erturk, et al., 
2008; Cushen, 2013). Furthermore, the shared meaning provided by the DCF model 
suggests other players might struggle to construct an alternative economic imaginary 
4 
As will be shown subsequently, the industry tends to use ‘price curves’ in their models rather than single equilibrium prices 
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distinct from the formalist model of DCF, with all the marketization and 
financialization implications reviewed earlier. 
Insert Figure 3. How the DCF model helped to constitute the generators’ negotiating imaginary 
 
Whilst helping to reveal potential policy bias arising from imaginaries shaped by 
neoclassical theories of economics, CPE enables radical and critical developments 
in performativity studies (Spicer et al., 2009; Wickert and Schaefer, 2015; Cabantous 
et al., 2016) by offering alternatives to those frames that support neoliberal solutions 
to environmental issues. An additional strength of CPE is that it can explain the 
variation, selection and retention of particular imaginaries. Although  imaginaries 
have considerable stability, they can be challenged during crises that loosen 
sedimentary social relations, allowing semiotic variations and the possibility of novel 
solutions. In the UK, regulators and other policy makers have, since the end of the 
1970s, framed regulations relative to an imaginary of competition and markets 
(Bowman et al., 2014; Thomas, 2016). Thus, it seems pertinent to ask: what sort of 
crisis might change this imaginary? More specifically, will the possibility of power 
cuts and blackouts constitute a sufficiently severe threat to result in the 
abandonment of the competitive market imaginary? To many, the possibility of 
electricity outages/blackouts constitutes a crisis. However, blackouts have occurred 
in the USA, without prompting significant changes in the ownership or mode of 
electricity generation. Indeed, as Roubini and Mihm (2011:38) point out, there are a 
multitude of views amongst economists as to what constitutes a crisis: 
Ask economists why booms and busts occur, and you’ll get a wide range of 
responses. Some will tell you that crises are inevitable consequences of 
government meddling in markets; others will maintain they occur because 
government didn’t meddle enough. Still others will claim that there is no such 
thing as a bubble: markets are perfectly efficient. 
In a CPE framework, it is possible to define crises through the criteria of political 
economy; capitalist owners define crisis, not in terms of blackouts (i.e. a problem for 
their customers), but rather in terms of threats to private ownership and/or falling 
profits. But the CPE framework also suggests that the notion of a crisis can be 
constructed by imaginatively combining data and DCF models. 
In summary, the relationship between CPE and performativity is one of mutual 
complementarity. In CPE, there is a neglect of aspects of practical materiality with 
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which to analyze the micro-processes of negotiation and power mobilization. Yet, in 
its favour, CPE places more emphasis on structural relations, which provides the 
context within which negotiations take place. For example, as we explain below in 
our empirical analysis of the GB electricity industry, we do not argue that the DCF 
model performed the structural move from nationalization to privatization. Yet, once 
that switch had taken place, we submit that the DCF model framed negotiations and 
reinforced neoliberal solutions. In terms of our empirical interpretation, CPE is a 
useful way of explaining either actual or potential changes in relations and is 
ontologically and epistemologically reconcilable with the performativity analysis of 
detailed negotiations within a privatized context. 
 
 
The GB electricity industry: an historical and field analysis 
Before the case study is presented it is important to understand the context of the 
industry. GB’s electricity industry can be analyzed in three parts: 1) The generation 
market (the power stations); 2) infrastructure; and 3) the supply market (the retailers). 
Currently, electricity companies can own just two of those segments: generation and 
retail; an independent company (National Grid) owns the infrastructure. Whilst the 
retail side of the industry has been heavily regulated, the ownership of the 
generators, who have had primary responsibility for investment decisions, was  
largely unregulated.5 Focusing on the power generating sector of the industry, the 
fieldwork presented in the following sections traces the course of negotiations 
between GB generators and the government, as represented by the main regulators: 
the Department6 for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) and the Office 
for Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). The empirical evidence demonstrates that 
throughout successive market designs (Callon, 2009), the DCF model framed the 
economic imaginary of investment at all levels: the plant, the company, the regulator 
and even at the supra-national level of the EU. During the detailed case study period 
(2006-2017), the industry operated under the British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements (BETTA), which was a fully open market, imposing 
minimal restriction on the buying and selling of ownership in electricity companies. 
Generators traded electricity through a variety of bilateral and multilateral contracts. 
5 
Apart from general regulations based around competition rules. 
6 
The regulators prior to June 2016 sat within the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
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However, against the backdrop of increased environmental regulation, subsidies for 
investment in certain technologies destabilized the pure market concept. 
Government interventions to combat climate change created spillover effects; 
tensions between the climate change agenda and seeking profit resulted in new 
market structures for investment, as will be observed later in this case study. 
By the first quarter of 2017, the big six energy generators dominated 83% of the 
supply market (Ofgem, 2017). At this time, stringent international standards on 
pollution and carbon production were imposed by the Department of Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Environment Agency (EA). Although the 
revised Large Combustion Plant Directive’s (LCPD) directive, introduced to reduce 
Nitrogen (NO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and particulates, was the main regulatory 
context of this case study, other regulatory efforts7 also played a role. 
Methods and Sources 
 
The case study that follows is split into two main phases. The basis for this split is 
partly the changing economic and political cultures or ‘conditions of felicity’ 
(MacKenzie, 2007) and partly the different sources of data. Thus, the first phase of 
the historical narrative draws on secondary data to understand the use of DCF/NPV 
in the electricity generating industry both prior to privatization and in the post- 
privatization period up to 2006. The second phase of the study draws on original 
fieldwork and other primary sources, and begins with the debates and negotiations 
leading up to decisions concerning whether companies would opt in or out of the 
LCPD during 2006-2008. 
 
 
The fieldwork described in this paper was specifically designed to investigate the 
investment decision-making processes applied within GB’s electricity generation 
industry with a particular focus on the possible impact of the revised LCPD. The  
main data collection was longitudinal in nature and was undertaken over a six-year8 
(2006-2012) period. Various organizations were consulted, including five of the big 
six generators. Each narrative was collected using semi-structured interviews, which 
7 
Related to concerns about carbon emissions and their possible impact on global warming. For example, the EU implemented 
an EU European Emission Trading scheme, to which all the electricity industries across Europe are subject. 
8 
See Appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of method and data collection. 
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were audiotaped and transcribed. Whilst the questions used in each interview were 
structured around three themes, considerations of the role of the actor sometimes 
resulted in modifications. The three themes were: 1) communication regarding 
investment decisions; 2) social, political and economic factors influencing investment 
decisions; and 3) resourcing, communication and power relations in the investment 
process. 
Fourteen interviewees contributed the data for the original study, and, in 2016, three 
additional interviews were conducted to collect industry perceptions regarding recent 
developments. Many of the interviewees were interviewed repeatedly. In addition, a 
business plan applied in the decision-making process was also used as a data 
description tool, alongside consultants’ responses to reforms in 2016/17. The 
interviewees included all stakeholders: generators, regulators, financial analysts and 
consultants, facilitating representation of the imaginaries of all those involved in the 
decision-making process. Further material data included shareholder reports and 
White Papers, and views collected at annual industry conferences to debate future 
policy and needs, attended by government ministers and the CEOs of the generators 
and regulators. In short, data collections included both human actors and non-human 
actors, as well as evidence such as presentations and networking activities, which 
could be seen as aspects of material practicality (Dugdale, 1999). 
 
 
Phase 1: Pre-privatization through to 2006 
 
 
The GB’s electricity generation industry can best be understood relative to the type 
of assets it holds, and the market structures that govern it. Significantly, power 
stations have long lives, and current industry assets have survived many changes in 
government. In particular, much of the generating capacity available today originates 
from the pre-privatization era (Jupe, 2012; Warren, 2014; Warren et al., 2018); a  
time when decisions on particular power stations could be framed by political 
concerns, such as maintaining employment in the deep coal mining industry. As 
Miller (1991) pointed out, DCF was promoted as a calculative device in the 
government’s economic imaginary during the 1960s, but as part of an interventionist, 
rather than a neoliberal, pro-market, economic policy. In an era which espoused 
indicative national economic planning, DCF was promoted as an appropriate 
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technique for investment appraisal in both the private and public sectors, stemming 
from the belief that it would encourage good quality investment and enhance national 
economic growth. In short, investment decisions marking the pre-privatization phase, 
when much of the current generating capacity was constructed, were influenced by 
quite different socioeconomic agencements. 
 
As part of the pro-market neoliberal programme of the Thatcher government (which 
was informed by academic economists with Austrian leanings9), the industry was 
privatized in 1990. After privatization, significant changes occurred affecting the 
market structure, with a competition oriented regulatory focus applied to the GB’s 
generation market (Bowman et al., 2014; Littlechild, 2014; Thomas, 2016; Warren et 
al., 2018). The period 1991-2001 is recorded as a very profitable phase for the 
industry. Several of the interviewees who worked during this decade explained that 
following privatization, business reports became more structured around 
shareholders’ needs. Thus the use of the DCF model became formalized as part of 
the decision making process and rates of return were seen as a critical piece of 
information, informing investment decisions. At this time profits were easier to 
achieve because every generator would receive the highest price offered by the 
National Grid. Finally, it is important to note that in this period investment decisions 
were not significantly influenced by environmental regulations (Warren et al., 2018). 
Overall, it seems that the performative role of the DCF model was particularly 
uneven in the early phases of our historical review, due to the ‘conditions of felicity’ 
(Callon, 2007), which varied during different historical periods. We have 
schematically summarized the main historical events and factors that affected 
investment processes in a timeline (see figure 5). This also indicates the differing 
degrees and types of performativity associated with the DCF/NPV model, as the 
composition of the networks in terms of human and non-human membership and 
relationships changed. Whilst the earlier phases of the historical review up to 2006 
are based mainly on secondary sources (Miller, 1991; Warren et al., 2018), the 
evidence on investment imaginaries in the period (2006-2016) is based on detailed 
and original fieldwork, as presented below. 
 
9 
In particular, the Director General of Electricity Supply (1989-98) was Professor Stephen Littlechild. 
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By 2006, although new sanctions were in place for those generators failing to comply 
with the LCPD, the GB government expected to meet environmental protection 
targets whilst maintaining its ideological commitment to a free market, privatized 
industry. This spillover effect was recognized by the generators whose own 
imaginary revealed the unprofitability of new investments (see figure 2) and  
predicted that without a change in policy future supplies of electricity were insecure. 
As we shall see below, the tensions between security of supply and regulations for 
environmental protection within a privatized industry, gave the generators an 




Phase 2: 2006-2008 The LCPD: conflicting imaginaries and opportunities for 
mediation 
During the 2000s, environmental regulations became more voluminous and 
influential, including the revised LCPD. The revised LCPD was introduced to reduce 
emissions by targeting combustion plants with a thermal capacity of 50 MW or 
greater. This regulation was applied to coal power stations, oil refineries and steel 
works. With stringent emissions limits, each operator was given the choice whether 
to opt in or opt out of the directive. In the case of electricity generators this meant all 
coal and oil plants had to decide whether to invest in the relevant technology to 
reduce emissions (known as opting in) or to close after a further 20,000 hours of 
operating (known as opting out). 
From the generators’ perspective, it was unclear what technologies and fuels the 
government would support and what market mechanisms would be put in place. The 
concern over technology and fuel was exacerbated at the time of the interviews, 
because two EU governments made unexpected and retrospective changes to the 
regulations within their own countries. Germany announced a nuclear tax regime, 
which was predicted to amount to around £12bn over five years and Spain 
retrospectively withdrew solar subsidies, after previously offering to encourage 
renewables (Citigroup, 2010). One Station Manager claimed: 
We were trying to get a good indication from the Government on what was 
going to be policy, going forward, you know you need them when you’re 
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investing for thirty years and spending hundreds of millions on them. There 
were no clear economic signals from the Government and when you actually 
looked at FGD at Plant B at the time it was hard to determine whether you’re 
making the right business decision for the shareholders. 
With the Head of Generation, UK, adding: 
We need clarity from the government on what they want from us. At the 
moment we are all looking into nuclear… a few plots of land that are really 
worth half a million have just been sold for two hundred and sixty million 
because there are limited sites with a chance to build nuclear on. But the 
prices just don’t support nuclear yet, this is not an efficient way of doing things. 
It would be better to organize who the players are who can do this, divide the 
land, give them the costs  and  let  them  get  on  with  it,  but  there  is  
nothing! …there is a gap at the moment, there’s a disconnect between pricing 
and the ambitions of the UK Government. 
In addition, an Environmental Manager stated: 
 
You know you’re not going to be making an investment if you’re not getting a 
return on that investment… there are a number of factors that need to be 
taken into account. But effectively an IA would be made on the technology 
that’s required to meet the particular limit... you know that if it didn’t meet the 
required rate then you know it’s unlikely to go forward (emphasis, added). 
The generators clearly wanted guaranteed prices that would underwrite their 
financial returns. As Head of Coal operations explained: 
We are expecting the government to pay some capacity payment or 
availability payments, they can’t keep going on the way that they are – the 
market is not working, and our modelling shows this. Secure prices will 
encourage new investment. (emphasis added.) 
 
 
The practical materiality of IA modelling in business planning and negotiating for the 
LCPD 
The quotations in the previous section, indicate that the generators aimed to 
influence the regulations in two aspects so that they reduced policy uncertainty with 
respect to approved technologies and offered guaranteed, rather than free market 
prices. In order to achieve these objectives, the generators were able to deploy 
practical materialities (Dugdale, 1999) to support the imaginary set out in figure 3: 
namely, their specialist engineering knowledge and the consistent application of IA 
models as a way of linking economic and environmental issues. With respect to 
deploying their specialist engineering knowledge, the consultations for the revised 
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LCPD presented generators with an invaluable opportunity to influence a new 
regulatory framework directly as new rules on specified environmental emissions 
targets were drawn up only after discussions between shareholders, regulators, and 
professional bodies. This process was one of trial and error, as all parties modelled 
the changes and the impacts they would have if changes to the regulations were 
made. Recognizing that the regulators could benefit from the generators’ technical 
knowledge, it became standard practice for firms to work alongside them, to avoid 
policy disrupting conflicts and disagreements (Sarasini, 2013). As one Environmental 
Manager noted: 
We had meetings with Defra and meetings with the EA through our JEP10 
forum. We sat around a table and tried to understand it. What does it mean 
when it says that you will meet this limit on sulphur? But you have this option 
to do it in a slightly different way. What are these time scales on monitoring? 
How can we interpret that in terms of something the EA can transform into a 
permit that we can carry out? 
The practical materiality of the DCF/NPV model was evident in performing a 
mediating role in both the internal decision making of the generators (linking 
environmental issues with financial returns) and in negotiations  with the regulators. 
In the latter case, the NPV model showed the link between the capital spend of the 
generators and government programmes. The generators embedded well-known IA 
techniques within more complex business plan models, capturing the impact of the 
regulatory changes. The NPV model was intrinsic to the internal modelling of 
environmental regulation, because as an executive who had responsibility for 
corporate regulation put it: 
When there is a lot of risk involved, especially with environmental regulation 
changes, we sometimes measure it as an option but that is using all the 
fundamentals of NPV. The volatility in the profitability due to the pricing 
sometimes means we are looking for intrinsic values to provide us with the 
confidence that we should go ahead. 
The twin performative aspects of the DCF model in both internal decision making 
and external negotiations were expressed as follows: 
NPV is the traditional method we use when looking at any investments and also 
when deciding how to lobby for change, we use this with the regulators through 
our published responses and with Treasury when we are acting as king of 
 
10 
Joint Engineering Project (JEP) 
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consultants to demonstrate things to them. However, that said, we do not show 
them our workings because that is confidential. We may show them the outcomes 
when we are analyzing different technologies or changes in the energy market 
framework. 
These twin aspects of negotiations within the companies and outside with public 
policy makers were illustrated when an interviewee who acted as a lobbyist 
described the company’s rhetorical tactics: 
We comment on National Grid's analysis, but you can imagine that they are well 
placed to analyze the entire system and weigh up risks. (But)…in our discussions 
with stakeholders we may comment on investor confidence based on policy 
uncertainty, or in the extremes the possible effects of introducing poor policy 
design. However, the discussions are more likely to be related to the cost of 
capital of projects, rather than the threat of a lights out situation. We try to be 
politically sensitive but our message is clear. 
 
 
In short, whilst showing due respect for the knowledge of the whole system 
possessed by the organizations responsible for the national electricity network, the 
lobbyist communicated the links between ‘poor’ public policy and private shareholder 
concerns. Although they avoided crass mobilization of the blackout threat, the 
lobbyist was confident that significant players like National Grid “got the message”. 
Although firms did not make their business models fully available, the researchers 
were able to access the business plans for one investment, which showed the 
routine use of the DCF model for investment decision making. The business plan is 
an example of the material content used as part of the investment decision making 
process. In the particular extract from the business plan in station A11 shown in 
exhibit 1, rules concerning the LCPD apparently created so much uncertainty that 
many of the generators originally chose to opt out. 
Insert Exhibit 1. Opting out early in the decision-making process (Source: Business Plan from one of 
the big six) 
Interview evidence confirmed the impact of regulatory changes on investment 




The name of the station has been changed to maintain anonymity. 
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For a long time it looked like the FGD, for the LCPD, was not an investment we 
wanted to make… but quite interestingly the rules on carbon changed and 
that’s what swung the pendulum back in favour of the investment… at the last 
second, we decided to opt in. A guy suddenly realized that the changes made 
the models go from red to black. (emphasis added.) 
Although this above quotation seems to imply the rule changes were just a “lucky 
coincidence”, Station A’s original decision to opt out strengthened the generators’ 
hand when lobbying the regulators. In this interpretation, regulatory decisions were 
adapted as an outcome of successful negotiating tactics (i.e. an investment strike). A 
further extract from the business plan shown in exhibit 2 explains the evolution of a 
more favourable investment climate. 
Insert Exhibit 2. Methodology changes within the modelling (Source: Business Plan from one of the 
big six) 
The business plans submitted to the board were presented as modelling outcomes, 
as demonstrated in exhibit 3. The NPV re-calculation reveals how the change in 
carbon policy improved the NPV calculation significantly; i.e. by £95 million for one 
project. Meanwhile, the emissions allocations methodology also transformed the 





Insert Exhibit 3. Modelling outcomes – note the reference to exhibit 1 in Exhibit 3 is due to the 
referencing in the original Business Plan. (Source: Business Plan from one of the big six) 
 
The information shown in Exhibit 3 provided the board with sound financial returns. 
The capital expenditure for the FGD installation was expected to be £211m and by 
2015 the central business case established an NPV of £58m with an IRR of 15.6%, 
and an NPV of Capex of 19%. The NPV modelling predictions were used internally  
to make the investment decision. This was one of the rare examples of a coal plant 
opting into the directive. The company commented in its business plan that this 
choice would differentiate it from the majority of its competitors. Their modelling was 
predicated upon the assumption that future lobbying would succeed, as apparent in 
the following exhibit from the Business Plan for Station A. 
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Insert Exhibit 4. The lobbying process (Source: Business Plan from one of the big six) 
 
By 2008, all the LCPD investment related decisions had been concluded (see Table 
1 for plants opting out of the directive), and many plants were marked for closure, or 
for investment in FGD to meet environmental targets. Table 1 shows many of the 
opted out plants were scheduled to close before the anticipated date of 2015. This 
earlier closure of many plants prompted renewed interest in the security of supply 
issue, leading to a consultation process for the Electricity Market Review (EMR). 
Since the introduction of the EMR, the closure of coal plants continued at some 
plants, such as at the Longannet Power Station, which closed earlier than expected, 
despite opting into the LCPD (Scottish Power, 2016). We will now consider the 
evolution of the EMR in more detail. 
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Insert Table 1. Opted out plants as of September 2013 (Source: Ofgem, 2012; with updates* from 
www.RWE.com and www.eon.com) 
Reflecting on our earlier theoretical discussion of framing, it appeared that there was 
widespread acceptance that the basic structures of the DCF model were robust 
(Doganova, 2011), and that the normative language of IA literature was also the 
natural language of industry players. When first questioned about how decisions to 
opt in or out of the LCPD were made, all the interviewees cited the same objectives 
and logic. The use of terms such as ‘rates of return’, ‘hurdle rate’, ‘NPV’, ‘IA’ and 
‘scenario analysis’ were all embedded within accepted ‘values’ of the business; all of 
which can be seen as the material reality forming part of the calculations. When 
discussing objectives, financial terms were the accepted language among all the 
stakeholders. Indeed, the basic financial terminology for IA was firmly established, in 
combination with knowledge about investment funding and the effect of risk on 
required return. 
The practical materiality (Dugdale, 1999) of the IA model was also observed, as it 
facilitated encounters and mediated between multiple frames of reference across 
finance, regulation and energy policies (Doganova, 2011, Miller and O’Leary, 2007). 
From the interview evidence, it emerges that the IA model was the central focus of 
discussions between specialists from different interest groups. In a similar manner to 
that described in the slide in figure 2, and as noted by the interviewees, the IA model 
enabled knowledge from individuals with diverse backgrounds (such as engineers, 
environmental specialists, traders, risk specialists and legal specialists) to be 
translated into readily comprehensible numbers. 
 
 
2008 – 2017: regulatory dilemmas and spillovers: the emergence of the EMR 
 
As noted earlier, the generators argued that the absence of an established 
investment policy had hindered their ability to make long term investment decisions. 
While the regulator understood this, it was inhibited by the key policy objective of 
delivering low prices to consumers. Ofgem’s remit was as follows: 
Protecting consumers is our first priority. We do this by promoting 
competition, wherever appropriate, and regulating the monopoly companies 
which run the gas and electricity networks. The interests of gas and 
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electricity consumers are their interests taken as a whole, including their 
interests in the reduction of greenhouse gases and in the security of the 
supply of gas and electricity to them. (www.ofgem.gov.uk) 
Thus, the regulator had no authority over the generators to force them to ensure a 
regular supply of electricity. As Ofgem’s website stated, they could take action only 
when a company breached their licence terms, acted anti-competitively, or breached 
consumer protection law; however, ‘failure to make investments’ was not governed 
by any sanction. A Station Manager noted the impotence of the regulators in terms of 
guaranteeing future investment: 
The regulators, Ofgem, have no legal back up to make us invest. The legal 
requirement for generators to ensure security of supply was removed through 
privatization. Of course, Ofgem can play around with the market structure12 to 
encourage investment but, so far, they have avoided this because both they 
and the government believed investment would be market led. This has not 
worked, market led investment will only work with a strong policy in place. 
As the fieldwork for this research commenced, Ofgem was denying that future 
security of supply was an issue, affirming their primary concern to be guaranteeing 
low prices. However, given the marketizing framing under which they operated, the 
objective of low prices was in direct conflict with investors’ demands for required 
rates of return. Following the significant loss of plants through the LCPD, and the 
investment hiatus that followed, the generators continued to lobby for radical 
changes to market structure, requesting ‘capacity payments13’ or price guarantees. 
Eventually, the government accepted the generators’ claim that the environmental 
directives and policies were challenging the pro-competition regulatory model (Stern, 
2014), such that pure market-led investment was no longer viable. 
The policy outcome in this case was the EMR. As Ofgem (2015a:1) explained, the 
EMR ‘is a government policy to incentivize investment in secure, low-carbon 
electricity, improve the security of Great Britain’s electricity supply, and improve 
affordability for consumers.’ The government announced two financial incentives to 





This comment was made prior to the government accepting the market had failed and before the 
EMR consultations began. 
13 
A capacity payment is a payment made to a generator to ensure that the potential for generation is 
being met. 
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 Feed-in Tariffs with Contracts for Difference (CfDs) – long-term contracts to 
provide guaranteed revenue to investors in low-carbon generation, i.e. 
renewables, nuclear, and CCS-equipped plants; and 
 Capacity agreements (within a Capacity Market) – payments for reliable 
capacity to be available when needed, intended to ensure security of supply. 
(DECC, 2011:1) 
It was apparent from the White Paper that presented these two new market 
mechanisms that lobbying based on the NPV accounting information had influenced 
the changes. For example, the White Paper discussed the need to reduce the cost of 
capital: 
These long term contracts, Feed-in Tariffs with contracts for Difference (FiT 
DfDs, which stabilize revenues, would increase the rate of investment  and 
lower the cost of capital, thereby reducing costs to consumers. (DECC, 2011:37) 
 
 
Both the Feed In tariff and Capacity agreement would be expected to feed into future 
IA modelling, by influencing both the price and quantity of electricity available within 
the system. The evolution of energy policy was summarized when, at the end of the 
decade, the government announced it had come to accept that the industry as a 
whole required major overhaul, because the earlier arm’s length approach had failed 
to deliver expected levels of investment. In essence, the agreed solution proposed 
by the generators was both pro-market and pro-interventionist, with a more assured 
investment climate based on guaranteed prices. As Helm put it: 
It’s an extraordinary volte-face to admit that a liberalized market won’t achieve 
its objectives. They have argued against intervention and said markets would 
engage with the issue of security of supply. The irony is incredible. (Helm as 
cited in Webb, 2010:1) 
The first capacity market emerged at the end of 2014, once the generators has secured 
the right to guaranteed pricing. However, the clearing price was £19.40 per Kilo Watt, 
which was far lower than the level required to secure new investment. Figure 4 shows 
the consequence was minimal new investment under the first capacity market, with only 
one large project given the go ahead: the Trafford gas power station, estimated to cost 
£800 million, to provide a capacity of 2060 Mega Watts. Although the power station was 
27  
due to begin generating by October 2018, in 2017 no financial backers had emerged, 
because, as explained by a Head of Generation UK: 
There were simply too many price takers; generators with old plants were willing 
to take low prices as long as it was adding a contribution. So the price makers, 
the new builds could not compete, and those who tried were not able to secure 
the investment needed. 
 
 
Insert: Figure 4: Allocated capacity contracts (Source: LCP, 2015) 
 
Although the first capacity markets promised guaranteed prices, they were set too 
low and so failed to stimulate the necessary levels of new investment. New 
investment now depended on fixing higher prices than those set for the first capacity 
auction. The introduction of the EMR altered the electricity industry landscape in GB, 
shifting it from a “Liberalized quasi-competitive market into one that is driven by the 
state” (Helm, 2014:1). The climate policies and regulations created a market reliant 
on regulated high prices, with the generating companies successfully lobbying the 
government for economic rents (Helm, 2014). 
During March 2016, a consultation process occurred addressing the problem of the 
capacity market’s failure to attract new investment. The consultation document  
clearly stated, “(T)he overarching message has been that the volume of capacity 
procured needs to rise and the clearing price needs to increase as a result in order   
to provide the appropriate incentives for the market to bring forward new gas 
capacity” (DECC, 2016:1). In order to avoid the problem of auctions that resulted in 
insufficient finance for new builds, a new proposal introduced a ‘Minimum Acceptable 
Auction Bid’ (MAAB), with bidders expected to produce robust financial support plans. 
This latter requirement was an open invitation to use DCF models as a feature of the 
“robust” financial support plans, and thus further legitimize the generators’ own 
preferred imaginary, as shown earlier in figure 2. 
However, despite these fresh incentives, the new system was still not working. 
Following the consultation process, the Department of Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) responded, and publically accepted the failings of the 
new system: 
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The government notes the committee’s assessment that there are two key failures 
in the current electricity market: the first relating to security of supply and the 
second relating to costs on consumers and business… the government has…. 
struggled to procure sufficient numbers of power stations through the mechanism 
to ensure long-term security of supply. (DBEIS, 2017:1) 
 
 
In a complete turnaround from its stance at the outset of this study, the government 
accepted that the industry was now at a critical point, adding: 
Security of supply should be the first and most important consideration in energy 
policy. Decarbonisation and affordability must be taken into account, but it should 
not be prioritized ahead of security where there is any conflict. (DBEIS, 2017:3) 
 
 
The historical relationships between key political events, the roles of DCF and the 
conditions of felicity (MacKenzie, 2007) are summarized in figure 5. By the end of the 
fieldwork research period, the essential character of the generators’ imaginary had 
not changed, whilst, in contrast, the socio-economic agencements of the industry 
had changed a number of times. Although the dominant ideology was still neo-liberal 
in the sense that investments in capitalist markets require the incentive of 
shareholder related rates of return; crucial inputs into the DCF model and hence the 
investment decision making process were now potentially underpinned by 
government guarantees. Although some overflows led to a new, more state 
interventionist market model, the basic economization, marketization and 
financialization frames were still driving decisions on investments and IA models, 
such as the DCF were as robust as ever (Doganova, 2011). The negotiating tactic of 
withholding new investment has been applied in other regulated industries in the UK. 
For example, Bowman et al. (2014) found that in the regulated UK telecoms market, 
industry players, such as BT, used the threat of an investment strike in the 
development of high-speed rural broadband to obtain public money to subsidize new 
investment. In the case of the generators, modelling future investments and then 
presenting clearly negative outcomes regarding supply in a discussion format, 
assisted their negotiating stance. We will now discuss these outcomes in the light of 
our CPE framework. 
 
 
Insert figure 5. Electricity industry timeline 
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Discussion: constructing and de-constructing the investment “crisis”- current 
profits, rates of return and alternative models of the foundational economy 
By drawing the future of the industry into the present (Miller, 2001), the DCF model 
has helped to constitute an imaginary of the current crisis, whereby a lack of new 
investment in generating capacity could be translated back into outcomes expressed 
in non-financial terms; i.e. power shortages and blackouts. If the generators’ 
imaginary, as shown in figure 2, leads to an accommodating response from 
regulators (Bowman et al., 2014), then that imaginary can be termed performative; in 
the sense that it altered present reality through the creation of a future reality, framed 
by the logics of DCF and neoclassical economics. 
Although the DCF model does not work well under conditions of uncertainty 
(Doganova, 2009), it can serve to highlight uncertainties, such as unknown future 
price curves and unknown future revisions to regulations on energy policy. However, 
these uncertainties are not based on “states of nature”, but rather on the IA 
discourse of marketization and financialization (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; 2010; 
Cushen, 2013), which ruled some solutions in (such as guaranteed prices) and 
others (such as direct public investment) out. In terms of MacKenzie’s (2007) 
taxonomy, discussed earlier, it would seem that the DCF model has been Barnesian 
performative. Or to use Callon’s (2007) terminology, the DCF formula has been 
actualized. As Callon puts it: 
…at a certain point in time, in certain places, the world of the formula is 
actualized, in such a way that it can be said that the formula describes and 
represents its world correctly. We are no longer in the register of truth as a 
reference but – to stick to the same word – in that of truth as success or 
failure, in truth as fulfilled conditions of felicity. The formula that is born 
performative, and remains so, seems to be constative when the world 
(finally) acts according to it. (2007: 321) 
 
 
As we argued earlier, the influential ‘Techno-market’ imaginary does not appear to 
conflict with the emerging EMR policy, even if it seems closer to Green Keynesianism 
(Levy and Spicer, 2013) than the earlier, less interventionist, regulatory approach. A 
more fundamental threat to the techno-market imaginary would entail a far more 
radical change in energy policy, involving direct public investment and ownership 
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which, at the time of writing, has been ruled out. Relating the empirical findings to a 
review of the performativity thesis, as reported earlier in the paper, prompts the 
question: how far can the decision to rule out direct public investment be attributed to 
the framing of the IA imaginary, or is it rather that the contradictions between the 
techno-market imaginary and the ‘material dimensions of economic life’ (Levy and 
Spicer, 2013: 662) have thus far failed to generate a crisis? More generally, what are 
the limits to the performativity thesis? As was shown in the preceding literature review, 
performativity cannot be separated from materialities and networks. Indeed, 
Vosselman concludes his review of Callonistics as follows: 
The reviewed studies are supportive of Callon’s claim that the performativity of 
economics is not the simple result of discourses that reflect certain ideologies, 
values and beliefs, but of power struggles in concrete-contingent networks in 
which economics and accounting are engaged. (2014:19) 
We submit that the CPE framework, and the concept of the imaginary can explain 
contrasts in energy investment from both a historical and an inter-country 
perspective. From an inter-country perspective, we note that a framework of public 
investment and control has not only been the preferred model in diverse countries, 
such as China and France, where attitudes towards state involvement differ from that 
in GB. From an historical perspective, key investment decisions in the pre- 
privatization GB industry were primarily correlated with political and engineering 
logics, not financial ones. The ineffective adoption of a market driven technique such 
as DCF in a publicly owned industry was unsurprising, since, in the absence of 
private property rights and a functioning bankruptcy court, market signals were not 
“real” (Wiseman, 1973). In sum, under a CPE framework, discoursal and the material 
dimensions are mutually supportive. The expansion of the private market sector 
encourages the spread of financialized thinking, as encapsulated in the DCF/point 
value complex (Bowman et al., 2012), which provides a market device that mediates 
the negotiations between public, quasi-public and private entities. 
A CPE perspective that draws on the performative concepts of spillovers offers a 
response to the question of why in GB (to date) direct public investment in electricity 
generation has been ruled out. Herein, we have focused on an economic imaginary 
framed in terms of financially-oriented IA models that bias discussions towards 
market-led solutions. Yet noting the inevitable presence of spillovers (Callon, 1998a; 
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1998b), our fieldwork reveals inherent limits to the “free” market, resulting in policies 
that involve a very flexible invocation of the DCF model in the service of proposals  
for a variety of market interventions and subsidies. These findings support the more 
general observation that the imaginary of the modern capitalist state offers a curious, 
contradictory mix of state and private action (Jessop, 1982). For example, the GB 
state currently spends billions on welfare but cannot (or will not?) build power 
stations. From a neoliberal perspective, the state cannot become “productive”, 
because that would then subvert the central role of private capital. Jessop (2013) 
argues that this laissez-faire perspective might change, as crises generate new 
solutions and new imaginaries. However, as previously argued, what constitutes a 
crisis may itself be difficult to define (Roubini and Mihm, 2011). In the case of 
electricity generation, the predicted crisis is denoted by blackouts and power cuts. 
However, as noted earlier in the paper, electrical power cuts have failed to trigger 
fundamental changes to the ideological presumptions behind private supply (Weare, 
2003) in countries such as the USA. Indeed, from a CPE perspective (Tinker, 1980; 
Cooper & Scherer, 1984), and in contrast with their negotiations with the regulators,  
a crisis for the generators has typically had very distinct economic characteristics. In 
short, crisis is not defined by electricity blackouts, but rather by a fall in the rate of 
profit and/or threats to private ownership of the means of production (Miliband, 1969). 
Conclusions 
 
Building on the literature on performativity and CPE theory, this paper has shown the 
prescriptive calculative techniques of IA, particularly DCF, can serve as economic 
prosthetics, enabling the economization, marketization and financialization of private 
and public policies on investment in new generation capacity. We have also shown, 
using original fieldwork, how the DCF model was deployed as a mediating device in 
negotiations on prices, technologies and costs, even where the main thrust of the 
regulatory effort was directed towards non-economic environmental goals. The 
empirics revealed that a key imaginary was based on the point value logic of the 
DCF model deployed by the generators; who, whilst under pressure to meet 
environmental demands, raised the possibility of an investment hiatus resulting in 
power cuts and blackouts. The fieldwork demonstrated how the normative model of 
IA played a key role in framing the negotiations between the generators and 
regulators, bringing the future into the present (Miller, 2001), and translating a 
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diversity of scientific, technological and economic data into a single metric. Although 
there were multiple loci of calculation, a shared market and point value imaginary 
was both enabled by, and enabling of, DCF/NPV logics. 
Furthermore, the DCF model played an objectifying role, by masking the genuine 
concerns of the generators, whilst limiting the choices apparently available to 
policymakers. In summary, the discourse of crisis, as associated with blackouts, 
masked the probability that the generators would themselves define crisis as falling 
rates of profit, or threats to private property rights. Despite its technical limitations as 
an investment evaluation technique, the DCF/NPV model emerged as a subtle, yet 
powerful, actor, responsible for mobilizing a variety of key players in negotiations on 
electricity prices and technologies. The power of the model was implicit, as it framed 
the terms of reference of the negotiation within a wider imaginary of markets and 
competition. One of the supreme ironies to emerge, is that, whilst it is not clear to 
what extent the actors who actually make investment decisions based their 
judgments on theoretically approved IA techniques, the political, economic and 
regulatory debates were framed by the language of rates of return and discount rates. 
To date, in the case of the GB electricity industry, the fundamental imaginary of 
market-led solutions has not been challenged. Different market experiments have 
been undertaken, involving a contradictory ideological mixture of limited state 
intervention and public subsidies and guarantees. From a public policy perspective, 
the political frame seems to be more myopic than the investment frame, reliant on 
short-term proposals that bribe industrial consumers to limit their electricity 
consumption as power shortages threaten. Furthermore, although clearly in the 
interests of the regulators to link issues of pricing and investment, as IA models do, it 
is less clear why other players have failed to question the underlying logic. 
One of the strengths of the theoretical and methodological frameworks of CPE is that 
semiotics and materiality both matter. It is perhaps unsurprising then, that it was in 
the economic interests of the generators to construct imaginaries based around DCF 
models. Certainly, it is rather more surprising that, while environmental targets 
initially played a significant role in the discourse surrounding the future of the 
generation sector in the UK, as time went on, the performative role of IA highlighted 
the capacity concerns of the generators and think tanks to push a market design 
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policy increasingly towards security of supply. If this conclusion suggests finality, 
then we might heed Callon’s warning when he states, ‘the game is never over, for 
new framings are always possible, always involving a bricolage of both the 
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Table 1. Opted out plants as of September 2013 (Source: Ofgem, 2012; with updates* from www.RWE.com 
and www.eon.com) 
 
 Company TEC MW Comment 
COAL:    
Ironbridge EON 964 Converting 485 MW to biomass 
Kingsnorth EON 1966 TEC withdrawn 3/2012 
Didcot A RWE 1558 Closed March 2013* 
Tilbury RWE 810 Ceases Q2 2013 Bio-refit? 
Ferrybridge 1&2 SSE 994  
Cockenzie Iberdrola 551 TEC withdrawn 3/2013 
Oil:    
Grain EON 1355 Closed 31/12/2012* 
Fawley RWE 940 Closed 31/3/2013* 
Littlebrook RWE 1245 Reduction to 800 MW at 3/2013 
 
